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INTERROGATION OF JUVENILES: THE
RIGHT TO A PARENT'S PRESENCE

INTRODUCTION

One mode of crime investigation utilized by the police is the
custodial questioning of suspects. 1 Prior to custodial questioning,
the suspect must be informed by the police, through the recitation
of the required Miranda warnings, of his constitutional right to
2
remain silent and of his right to the assistance of counsel. If
3
the suspect is a juvenile, however, the suspect may request to see
his parent, rather than an attorney. The situation was aptly described by the Supreme Court of California:
For minors, it would seem that the desire for help naturally manifests in a request for parents. . . . It is fatuous
to assume that a minor in custody will be in a position to
call an attorney for assistance and it is unrealistic to attribute no significance to his call for help from the only
person to whom he normally looks-a parent or guardian.
It is common knowledge that this is the normal reaction
of a youthful
suspect who finds himself in trouble with
4
the law.

Despite judicial recognition that a juvenile naturally looks to his
parents for aid,5 the courts have not yet extended the right to such

assistance to the youthful suspect faced with custodial interrogation."

The admissibility

of confessions

elicited during

interroga-

tion from a juvenile who has waived his right to an attorney have

been a persistent problem for the courts. Increasingly such confessions have been found to have been involuntary.7

In examin-

1. See F. IBAU & J. REm, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(2d ed. 1967). Cf. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Rogge,
Proof by Confession, 12 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1966).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. The juvenile court statutes usually define a juvenile as an individual under eighteen years of age. For a general discussion of the upper
age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction see THE PRIUE)Nr's COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRniE 4 (1967).
4. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 382, 491 P.2d 793, 797-98, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 5-6 (1971), noted in 23 SYR. L. REV. 950 (1972).
See notes 85-94
and accompanying text infra.
5. United States v. Fay, 323 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1963); People v.
Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 382, 491 P.2d 793, 797-98, 99 Cap. Rptr. 1, 5-6 (1971).
6. See notes 113-116 and accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Shelly, 305 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1969),
modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1970); Walker v. State,
12 Md. App. 684, 280 A.2d 260 (1971).

ing these confessions great weight is given to the absence of a
parent during the interrogation of the juvenile.8 This Comment
will discuss the possibility of extending this case law one step
further to provide the juvenile a constitutional right to a parent's
presence at interrogation. It will analyze the approaches taken
by various courts when dealing with the problems of juvenile
interrogation, the protection a right to a parent's presence may provide, the arguments against the existence of this right, and the
constitutional basis of the right. The topic will be developed
through an examination of existing constitutional restraints on
the interrogation process and of the application of the constitution to juveniles.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON INTERROGATION

The United States Supreme Court first placed limits on state
interrogation procedures through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 9 A confession, elicited by interrogation or
otherwise, was inadmissible unless it was "voluntary,"' 1 a requirement of the common law.'1 In reviewing claims of impermissible tactics used to elicit a confession, the Supreme Court examined the surrounding circumstances of each case to determine if
the confessions were voluntary. 12 Safeguards recognized in these
8. See notes 74-82 and accompanying text infra.
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
See generally Ritz,
Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35 (1962); Comment, Developments
in the Law-Confessions,79 HARv. L. REv. 935 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) in
which the Court stated:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly
established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years:
the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he
has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if
his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due
process.
11. See The King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach C.L. 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep.
234, 235 (K.B. 1783). For a complete discussion of the common law rules as
to voluntariness see Comment, Developments in the Law--Confessions, 79
I-Inv. L. REv. 935, 954 (1966).
12. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); Procunier v. Atchley, 400
U.S. 446 (1971); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Boulden v. Holman,
394 U.S. 478 (1969); Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968) (per curiam)
Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968) (per curiam); Clewis v. Texas,
386 U.S. 707 (1967); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967); Sims v. United
States, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967);
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynum
v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958);
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426
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state cases under the fourteenth amendment reflected the policies
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.13 The
guidelines established that either physical 14 or psychological' 5
pressure could constitute coercion and render a confession involuntary. Threats,' 6 fatigue, 7 arousing false sympathy through a
boyhood friend,"' refusing contact with the outside world,' 9 and
sustained and protracted periods of questioning 20 have been considered coercive in particular cases. The Supreme Court added
special factors to be considered when looking at the circumstances
surrounding the confession of a minor: age and the presence or
2
absence of a friendly adult. '
(1958); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Thomas v. Arizona, 356
U.S. 390 (1958); Pikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556 (1954); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); Harris v. South Carolina, 338
U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 332 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Lomax
v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Lisenba v. California, 313 U.S. 537 (1941);
White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1941); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
13. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court discussed Malloy:
Aside from the holding itself, the reasoning in Malloy made clear
what had already become apparent-that the substantive and procedural safeguards surrounding admissibility of confessions in
state cases had become exceedingly exacting, reflecting all the policies embedded in the privilege, 378 U.S. at 7-8.
384 U.S. at 464.
14. See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
15. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
16. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (threatening to
take infant son away); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (threatening to bring the defendant's wife in for questioning).
17. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (sixteen
days of questioning); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36
hours of continuous questioning).
18. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
19. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (refusal to
allow call to his wife or a lawyer until he confessed); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (request to see lawyer denied); Payne v. Arkansas
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (nineteen-year old denied permission to make phone
call).
20. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
21. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (fourteen-year old); Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (fifteen-year old). See text accompanying notes
36-38 infra.

In federal cases coerced confessions were excluded on the
basis of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 2 2 After this privilege was held enforceable against the
states, 23 the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois,24 added a pro-

tection against coercion by extending the sixth amendment right
to counsel to the interrogation stage. 25 Finally, in Miranda v.
Arizona2 6 the subtle intimidation of incommunicado interrogation
itself was recognized as infringing the accused's free choice required by the fifth amendment privilege. 27 As a means of limiting this sort of coercion, the Court required that certain warnings
be given, including notice to the accused of his right to the presence
of an attorney. 28 Miranda further requires that if the individual
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated,
questioning must cease. 29 It is now established that all the "principles embodied in the fifth amendment privilege apply to informal
compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." 3 To be admissible, confessions are subject to
the voluntariness standard of the fifth amendment, a standard
which is now identical in federal and state courts.3 1
II.

JUVENILES

AND THE

CONSTITUTION

Although Escobedo and Miranda curtailed interrogation procedures not in harmony with the policies of the fifth amendment

privilege, it was not immediately clear whether these constitutional
protections were equally applicable to juveniles.3 2 Juvenile courts
22.

Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The Court said:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, whenever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because
not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth
Amendment . . . commanding that no person 'shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'
Id. at 542. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943); Ziang Sun Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
23. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
24. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25. See notes 116-118 and accompanying text infra.
26. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text infra. See generally
GEORGE, A NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: EsconEDo--Tams SEcOND RouND (1967)
28. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). The Miranda "warnings" require that
prior to any questioning of a suspect he must be warned: (1)that he has a
right to remain silent; (2) that any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him; (3) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney;
(4)ifhe cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for him. A study
of the implication and effect of Miranda in one community isfound in
Comment, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L.J. 1519 (1967).
29. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
30. Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S.436, 461 (1966).
31. See Davis v.North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Rogge, Proof by
Confession, 12 VLL.L.REv. 1 (1966).
32. See Altman, The Effect of the Miranda Case on Confessions In
the Juvenile Court, 5 AM. CuMv. L.Q. 79 (1967).
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were based on the parens patriae33 doctrine that the "proceedings
were not in the nature of a criminal trial but constitute merely
a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation
and rehabilitation of the minor child. ' 34 Constitutional rights
afforded the criminally accused had no applicability to these "civ36
il" proceedings.
However, minors prosecuted under adult criminal proceedings
could not be interrogated by methods offensive to due process. In
Haley v. Ohio,30 a fifteen year old's confession was held involuntary because it had been obtained by incommunicado interrogation for three days. The Supreme Court in Haley concluded that
without the aid of friend or counsel, "the youth was no match
to the police under these circumstances.3 Fourteen years later in
Gallegos v. Colorado,"' a youth had been detained for five days,
during which time he had no advice from an attorney or friend.
The Court, following Haley, held the confession inadmissible because it was obtained through means that violated due process.
A paternalistic system of justice designed to protect the child
from the scarring effect of criminal process is a laudable ideal.39
The informal procedures utilized by such a system, however, are
susceptible to many abuses, and the original goals have never
been fully realized. 40 The United States Supreme Court first noted
its dissatisfaction with the juvenile court system by dictum in Kent
v. United States. 41 The Court held in that case that where there is
33. The relationship of the state with the juvenile is that of parent
and child.
34. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1955). For a
general discussion of the development of the juvenile court see THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTIcE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUvENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2 (1967).

35.

See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).

But see

Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387

(1961); Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 HOWARD L.J.

76 (1966).

36.

332 U.S. 596 (1948).

37.

Id. at 600.

38. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
39.

40.

See note 34 and accompanying text supra.

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), wherein many commentaries on

the problems of the juvenile courts are cited.
41. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Court said:
[S]tudies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as
to whether actual performance measures well enough against

theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process

from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults.
• . . There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he

gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitious

a waiver of jurisdiction over a youthful offender by the juvenile court to the adult court the hearing must measure up to the
cessentials of due process and fair treatment. ' 42 Then in In re
Gault,43 the Supreme Court extended fundamental constitutional
rights to juveniles in an effort to guarantee fairness in the juvenile
courts. In an opinion specifically limited to the adjudicative
phase of juvenile courts, the constitutional right to notice of
charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination
were afforded to juveniles through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 44 Further, In re Winship45 established
that the constitutional requirement that guilt of a criminal charge
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt be used in juvenile court.
These procedural rights were considered consistent with the juvenile court philosophy, 46 and were extended to juveniles partially due to a recognition that there is therapeutic value in the
47
appearance of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness.
Not all the constitutional rights available to adults in criminal
proceedings were extended to juveniles, however. The redesigned
juvenile court after Gault was not required to resemble its adult
49
counterpart in every respect. 48 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
the United States Supreme Court declined to impose the right to a
jury trial on the juvenile court proceedings. Winship and McKeiver indicated criteria for determining the applicability of constitutional rights to juveniles. Factors to be considered are: (1)
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
Id. at 555-56.
42. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966). The decision was
based upon a statute of the District of Columbia (Juvenile Court Act) D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-1551, § 16-2307, § 16-2307, § 16-2313 (1967), read in the
context of constitutional principles of due process and assistance of counsel. The juvenile was entitled to a hearing, to access by his counsel to
social records and reports considered by the juvenile court, and a statement of the reasons of the juvenile court's decision. Id. at 557.
43. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court stated:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process
has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals, and inadequate or inaccurate findings of
fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.
Id. at 19-20.
44. Id.
45. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
46. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), wherein the Supreme Court
stated:
We conclude as we concluded regarding the essential due process
safeguards applied in Gault, that the observance of the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt 'will not compel the States to
abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile
process.'
Id. at 367.
47. In re Gault,387 U.S. 1,26 (1967).
48. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
49. Id.
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the right must be a "vital" one;5 0 (2) the right must remedy
defects of the juvenile system; 51 (3) it cannot compel the states to
abandon the substantive benefits of the juvenile process; 2 and
(4) it cannot have the effect of remaking the juvenile proceeding
into a fully adversary proceeding.53 Although the Court has ruled
only on the applicability of constitutional rights to the adjudicative stage of juvenile proceedings, the criteria established by
these decisions may indicate which rights the juvenile possesses
at other stages. These criteria leave little doubt that the juvenile subject to interrogation has all the constitutional protections afforded the adult at that stage. Although Gault, which extended the coverage of certain fundamental rights to include juveniles in juvenile proceedings was limited to the adjudicative stage
of juvenile proceedings, 54 the full fifth amendment privilege was
accorded to juveniles by Gault, seemingly including the right to
exercise the privilege at any stage in the proceedings:
[I]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege against
self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals
but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception.
And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. 55
Gault concluded that the "privilege against self-incrimination
is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to
adults."'56 Further, the Miranda warnings have been required by
statute or by judicial decision, prior to juvenile questioning.5 7 Surrounding juvenile interrogation with full constitutional safeguards is consistent with the parens patriae ideal of protecting
50.
51.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-65 (1970).
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 529 (1971):
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system
would not remedy the defects of the system. Meager as has
been the hoped-for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative
would be regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would
tend once again to place the juvenile squarely in the routine of
the criminal process.
Id. at 547. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967).
52. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
53. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 529 (1971).
54. See notes 99-100 and accompanying text infra.
55. 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
56. Id. at 55.
57. See, e.g., People v. Horton, 126 Ill. App. 2d 401, 261 N.E.2d 693
(1970).
For a discussion of the applicability of the Miranda warnings
prior to juvenile questioning see Ferster and Courtless, The Beginning of
Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND.
L. REv. 567, 592-96 (1969).

the minor, as the relationship between police and juvenile may be
less than paternalistic. 8
Even full constitutional protection enjoyed by the accused,
however, may not be adequate when the accused is a juvenile. In
Haley v. Ohio5 9 and Gallegos v. Colorado6" the United States Supreme Court recognized that what is "fair treatment" of a youth un-der the due process clause is not to be equated with standards of fairness for an adult. Gault requires that both the parent and the
minor be advised of the child's right to counsel in juvenile court.6 '
Extending procedural protections to the juvenile not given the
adult does not mean juveniles have more rights than adults, but
is based on the belief that without them juveniles are in an in6 2

ferior position.

III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE PRESENCE OF A PARENT AT
JUVENILE INTERROGATION:

THE FIFTH AMENDIENT PRIVILEGE

AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Special considerations come into play when the courts deal
with the question of the admissibility of confessions of juveniles
elicited during interrogation. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the admission must be carefully examined. Both age and
the presence or absence of a friendly adult are factors which must
be considered. They are considered by the court to insure that the
immaturity of the juvenile has not affected his ability to freely
exercise his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of
counsel.6 3 Although the juvenile was accorded full constitutional
protection at interrogation, problems relating to the juvenile's immaturity must be handled by the courts. Compared with the
adult, the procedural protections of Miranda may not offer the
same protection against coercion to juveniles. 4 Further, since
these constitutional rights may be waived, 65 the question arises
whether a juvenile's waiver is with a complete understanding of
its effect. 66 Commentators have argued that a juvenile is incapable of making a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of constitutional
rights.6 7 Aside from the problems of coercion and waiver, juvenile
58. See State v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 179, 416 P.2d 311, 314 (1966).
59. 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
60. 30 U.S. 49 (1962).
61. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
62. See generally Ferster and Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile
Justice, Police Practices and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VANm. L. REV.
567, 596-98 (1969).
63. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 124 infra.
65. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
66. See Ferguson and Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1970). The study tested the understanding of Miranda
rights by fourteen-year-olds. They found that 96% of those who voluntarily waived the rights failed to understand them.
67. COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL ON CImE Am DELN-

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

confessions are recognized as being by nature highly unreliable.68
There is a strong psychological temptation for a youth to confess falsely so as to be released from the pressure of questioning. 69 Finally, since rehabilitation theoretically begins the moment a minor comes in contact with the system of justice,70 the
initial impression should be one of fairness. Otherwise, the minor
71
may be imbued with a disrespect for lawful authority.
In recognition of the questionable reliability of juvenile confessions, the possibility of coercion, or an unintelligent waiver of
constitutional rights, courts have placed increasing weight on
the presence or absence of a juvenile's parent when examining
a juvenile's confession1 2 The importance of this factor to the question of voluntariness of a juvenile's confession was established by
the United States Supreme Court in Haley and Gallegos. In both
cases interrogation without the assistance of a "friendly adult" was
an important factor considered by the Court in determining that
from the totality of the circumstances the confessions were obtained in violation of due process. 73 The fourteen-year old suspect
in Gallegos was detained for five days alone during which time
the boy's mother was denied permission to see him. 74 The Supreme
Court in that case stated that:
[H] e cannot be compared with an adult in full possession
of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his
admissions. .

.

. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend

could have given the petitioner the protection which his
QUENCY-MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS, Rule 25 and accompanying
commentary at 54 (1969); Note, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 1149 (1068). But see People v. Lara, 62 Cal. Rptr. 587, 432 P.2d 202
(1967), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 945 (1968), in which the California Supreme
Court extensively discusses the problem of whether a juvenile is competent
as a matter of law to waive his constitutional rights, absent the advice of
an adult or counsel. The majority concluded a juvenile alone may competently waive constitutional rights. In Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa.
350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not rule
as a matter of law that a sixteen-year old is incapable of waiving his right
to counsel before being questioned as this would be to "ignore reality and
the sophistication of the average sixteen-year old in these days and times."
Id. at 354, 2a7 A.2d at 133.
68. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 52-55 (1967).
69. COUNcsL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY-MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE CouRTs, Rule 25 and accompanying

commentary at 54 (1969).
70. Davis, Justice for the Juvenile: The Decision to Arrest and Due
Process, 1971 DUKE L.J. 913, 924

71.

Id.

72.
73.
74.

See notes 76-82 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
370 U.S. 49 (1962).

own immaturity could not.75

Several state courts have extended the rationale of Haley and Gallegos by emphasizing the absence of a parent when a juvenile
waives the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination during interrogation.7 6 In In re Carlo,7 7 two juveniles,
thirteen and fifteen years old, were questioned at the police station
along with the other neighborhood boys who knew a ten-year old
victim of strangulation. Both boys confessed, with some inconsistencies in their statements, during an almost six hour interrogation. During the questioning the parents of the boys had made
repeated requests to see them, but were refused. The police testified that the boys were told of their constitutional rights and that
the fifteen-year old had declined when he was asked if he wanted
to see his parents. The Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded
that from the totality of the circumstances under which the confession was obtained, "particularly the repeated refusal by the
police to let the parents see their sons,"7 8 the confessions were
not voluntary. The position of the Carlocourt was that
[T] he refusal by the police in the present case to permit
the parents access to their sons might well be sufficient in
itself to show that the confessions were involuntary, even
though as the79police testified, the boys did not wish to see
their parents.
Another court, faced with the related problem of whether the
juvenile knowingly and intelligently waived his rights after the
Miranda warnings were given, found the waiver to be invalid after
an examination of the totality of the circumstances.8 0 Among
the circumstances were the age of the defendant (fifteen years)
and the denial of access to the father who had made repeated requests to see his son. The court in this case felt compelled to add
by dictum that in these circumstances the defendant should have
had the opportunity to consult his father, and that:
[T]he Miranda warning that a boy had a right to consult
a lawyer was hollow indeed when he was denied access
to his father who, practically speaking, was the only avenue through which he could effectively evaluate and, if
he wished, exercise the right to counsel.8 1
Under certain circumstances courts have found confessions of
juveniles to be involuntary when a parent was not present during the questioning.82 The totality of the circumstances evalua75. Id. at 54.

76. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 12 Md. App. 684, 280 A.2d 260 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Cain, 279 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1972); In re Carlo, 48 N.J.
224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966).
77. 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966).
78. Id. at 243, 225 A.2d at 120.
79. rd. at 241, 225 A.2d at 119.
80. Commonwealth v. Cain, 279 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1972).
81. Id. at 710 n.3.
82. But see State v. Hance, 2 Md. App. 162, 233 A.2d 326 (1967); Corn-
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tion has been the traditional method utilized by courts to handle
the problems of juvenile interrogations and confessions.88 There
has been dissatisfaction with this approach to confessions, evidenced most notably by the United States Supreme Court's addition to this test of the requirement that the suspect in custodial
interrogation be surrounded with the Miranda safeguards.8 4 Several courts, following the lead of Miranda, have not remained
confined to the totality of the circumstances test as the sole mode of
approaching the problems of juvenile interrogation and confessions, but have innovatively faced the problems. These are discussed below.
A. People v. Burton
One innovative approach to juvenile interrogation was urged
upon the Supreme Court of California by the defendant in People
v. Burton.8 5 California is a jurisdiction wherein the use of the
totality of the circumstances test to examine the validity of juvenile confessions is well-established.8 6 In this case the sixteenyear old defendant was denied his request to see his parents made
just prior to the commencement of interrogation.8 7 Subsequent
to the denial of the juvenile's request, a police officer carefully explained to the defendant his Miranda rights. The defendant indicated he understood these rights and waived them. The juvenile did not contend the confession was involuntary, but relying
on Miranda, contended that it was unlawfully obtained. He asserted that the request to see his parents was an invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination.88 Other jurisdictions had held
that a request to see a parent did not render an otherwise volunmonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972); Vaughn v. State,
456 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1970).

83. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).

84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Kamisar, What Is An Involuntary Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions, 17 RuTGERs L. Rxv. 728 (1963), wherein the difficulties of interpreting the voluntariness test of confessions are discussed. The author
concluded:
The due process confession cases have too often been characterized by Indians-attacking-the-covered-wagon tactics, i.e., circling around and around the problem and taking pot shots at it.
The time has come for a more direct approach.

Id. at 759.

85. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
86. See, e.g., People v. Lara, 62 Cal. Rptr. 587, 432 P.2d 202 (1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968).
87. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 380, 491 P.2d 793, 796, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 4 (1971).
88. Id. at 381, 491 P.2d at 796, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 4.

tary confession involuntary under the totality of the circumstances test.8 9 The court in Burton, relying on a line of decisions 0
adhering to the Miranda standard that if an individual indicates
in any manner that he wishes to remain silent interrogation must
cease, liberally applied this safeguard to the juvenile who requested
to see his parents. The Burton decision, recognizing that a minor
who wants help naturally turns to his parents for aid,9 ' held that
a juvenile's request to see his parent when he is in custody for
questioning is an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination at that moment unless there is evidence to the contrary.92
Although the court in Burton did not extend to the minor an affirmative right to see his parents, the decision resulted in protecting the juvenile from any further questioning, as any subsequent confession would be characterized as not voluntary.
However, the juvenile may later waive his invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination by indicating he would like
93
to confess, and therefore the police questioning may resume.
With Burton there still exists the problem that if the request for
the presence of parents is denied by the police, although police
questioning must cease, the juvenile may believe that his only relief from custody would be by cooperating and "volunteering" a
confession. It is also unclear what evidence offered by the state
would be sufficient to show that the minor's request for parental
aid was not an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.9 4 The juvenile needs greater protection than the Burton
holding affords.
B. Freeman v. Wilcox
Whereas Burton has established safeguards for the juvenile
based on Miranda, several courts95 have extended to the interro-

gation stage the Gault requirement that both parent and juvenile
89. See People v. Pierre, 114 Ill. App. 2d 283, 252 N.E.2d 706 (1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) discussed in the text accompanying notes
113-116 infra; State v. Hance, 2 Md. App. 162, 233 A.2d 326 (1967).
90. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658
(1970) (a suspect's telephone call to his attorney in and of itself invoked
the fifth amendment privilege); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450
P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1969) (suspect's statement "call my parents for
my attorney" invoked the privilege); People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441
P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968) (refusal to sign a waiver of constitutional
rights invoked the privilege).

91.

See text accompanying note 4 supra.

92. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 383-84, 491 P.2d 793, 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
94. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 383, 491 P.2d 793, 798, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6 (1971).
95. Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970); Freeman v.
Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969). See McClintock v. State,
253 Ind. 333, 253 N.E.2d 233 (1969).
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must be advised of the child's right to counsel.9 6 In Freeman v.
Wilcox" 7 a fourteen-year old confessed after being held in detention for five days without seeing his parents or counsel. No request was made by the minor for outside aid, and there was a dispute as to whether he had been informed of his right to counsel.
On appeal, the court held the confession inadmissible on the ground
that the parents were never advised of the child's right to counsel
during interrogation. 98 Freeman interpreted the Gault footnote which stated that
what we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process. 99
as an observation by the United States Supreme Court that the
holding of Gault may have application to other steps of the juvenile process. 100 The interrogation stage is a critical stage because the information elicited from the suspect could later be
used against him at the adjudicatory stage.10 1 The Freeman court
recognized that with respect to the minor's decision to exercise his
right to have an attorney, parental advice was as necessary out of
court as before the court. 0 2 It remains to be determined by the
Georgia courts after Freeman whether the juvenile may have a
parent present during interrogation if both waive the right to
counsel. This would be going beyond the holding in Gault but not
the spirit and premise of Gault, relied on by the Freeman court,
to protect the juvenile. The juvenile needs the aid of his parent
in the exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent, as well

as, the right to counsel. 10 3 The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Dan04
iels v. State,1
mandated that the parent be competent when
called in to advise his child. In Daniels the juvenile's confession
was held inadmissible because police had questioned the child after his mother had shown up under the influence of intoxicants, thought not drunk, to advise her son.' 0 5
At times a parent's presence during interrogation may not be in
the juvenile's best interests. 0 6 The parent may induce the mi96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969).
119 Ga. App. 325, 329, 167 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1969).
387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1967) (emphasis added).
119 Ga. App. 325, 328, 167 S.E.2d 163, 166 (1969).
Id.
Id. at 328-29, 167 S.E.2d at 166-67.
See note 124 and accompanying text infra.
226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970).
Id.

106.

See S.
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nor to confess. The juvenile may feel he must exonerate himself
before his parents by cooperating with the police and by not appearing stubborn. 0 7 Further, the parent's own resentment and
embarrassment may lead him to influence the juvenile in the direction of admission and therefore punishment. 10 8
Despite these considerations, the presence of a parent would
not ordinarily be adverse to the juvenile's interests. It is a cardinal rule of police interrogation to be alone with the suspect.10 9 At
the same time, courts have recognized the coercive effect of incommunicado interrogation." 0 It follows that the parent's presence would generally lessen the coercive atmosphere that arises
when a juvenile is alone with the police. If, on the other hand, the
parent's presence in a particular case proves to be adverse to the
interests of the juvenile this fact would be part of the totality of
the circumstances considered by the court in its determination of
the voluntariness of the confession."' Also if a right to a parent's presence were recognized by the courts, this right could be
waived." 2 Just as the minor need not consult an attorney, he
may choose not to have the parent present. The juvenile may not
desire parental aid, knowing that his parent's interest would be
adverse to his own. If the juvenile does request the parent's
presence, however, it is probable that the parent-child relationship will be such that the parent would be inclined to protect the
constitutional rights of the youth.
C. People v. Pierre
California in People v. Burton and Georgia in Freeman v. Wilcox went beyond the totality of the circumstances test to assure
fair treatment for the juvenile at interrogation. No court, however, has yet taken the step of regarding the right to a parent's
presence at interrogation constitutionally protected. The existence of such a constitutional right was denied by the only decision
ruling on this question, People v. Pierre."3 in this case, a seventeen-year old, who was denied his repeated requests to see his
mother, then present at the police station, confessed after being
detained for less than three hours. On appeal he contended that
the doctrine of Escobedo v. Illinois," 4 which affords the suspect
(1971). The author notes that being an adult provides no guarantee against
being intimidated by police surroundings. See Driver, Confessions and
the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HAiv. L. REv. 42.(1968).
107. See S. Fox, supra note 106, at 128.
108. Id. Cf. Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639, 642, 188 S.E.2d 828, 829
(1972).
109. F. INBAU & J. REmD, supra note 1, at 5.
110. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text infra.
111. Cf. Daniels v. State, 226 Ga. 269, 174 S.E.2d 422 (1970).
112. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
113.

114 Ill. App. 2d 283, 252 N.E.2d 706 (1969).

114. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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the right to counsel at interrogation, included the denial of a
minor suspect's request to see his parent during interrogation.' 15
The court rejected this claim by interpreting Escobedo as based
solely on the sixth amendment:
The constitutional right sought to be protected by Escobedo is the Sixth Amendment right to the advice of an attorney. .

.

.

While the presence or absence of a parent

or responsible adult during the interrogation of a minor
suspect may be a factor affecting the voluntariness of a
confession, there is no constitutional right to the presence
of a parent. We find that the Escobedo doctrine is not
applicable
to a request for anyone other than an attor11 6
ney.
Without question, the sixth amendment"1 7 provides for the juvenile
at interrogation the assistance of no one but an attorney.
Allowing a juvenile the aid of a parent during interrogation
would, it is suggested, further the policy of the fifth amendment
that no one be compelled to incriminate himself. Escobedo extended the right to the assistance of counsel to the interrogation
stage with a dual purpose; to guard against coerced confessions,
and to insure the defendant's access to legal advice at the critical
interrogation stage. n 8 The fifth amendment is the basis of safeguards for the accused at interrogation.' 19 The leading case on
custodial interrogation, Mirandav. Arizona stated:
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is
at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.' 20
The Supreme Court, by requiring the Miranda warnings, attempted
115. People v. Pierre, 114 IMI. App. 2d 283, 290, 252 N.E.2d 706, 709
(1969).
116. Id. at 291, 252 N.E.2d at 710.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, . . . and to have the assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
118. The Court stated in Johnson v. New Jersey, (holding that Miranda and Escobedo not be applied retroactive), 384 U.S. 719 (1966):
Our opinion in Miranda makes it clear that the prime purpose of
these rulings [Escobedo and Miranda] is to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination, the mainstay of our
adversary system of criminal justice....
Id. at 729.
119. See notes 22-31 and accompanying text supra.
120. 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966).

to dispel the "inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as
it is presently conducted."'1 21 It is submitted that an interrogation is coercive when a juvenile is refused access to a parent. In
Ledbetter v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,'2 the court discussed
the effect on a youth, alone with the police, when his requests to
contact his family were refused:
The crucial inquiry is the suspect's knowledge he will continue to be kept incommunicado. The coercive influence
cannot be measured by the number of hours Ledbetter was
actually detained, but only by the effect upon him of the
obvious intention of the police to persist in their secret
inquisition without granting
his request to communicate
12
with the outer world. '
Even where a "good faith" effort by the police to locate the parents of a juvenile suspect failed, interrogation under the circumstances was held improper in In re Nelson:
Respondent's confession was procured after he had been
for at least eight hours in incommunicado police dominated
detention . . . the mere recital of his "rights" to a youth

of 14, who was unattended by a guardian or counselor or
friend, was insufficient to alleviate
24 the coercive atmosphere borne of these circumstances.
The Miranda majority, in reference to the Escobedo decision,
noted that the denial in that case of the defendant's request for
the assistance of counsel heightened the defendant's dilemma and
rendered his later statements the product of compulsion. 125 As
the juvenile naturally turns to his parent for aid, a denial of this
assistance is no less coercive than the practice condemned in Escobedo. The protective devices of Miranda were not intended to be
exclusive:
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is
it intended to have this effect . ... 126
Just as the Miranda protective devices for interrogation are required by the fifth amendment, this same amendment could be the
basis for further safeguards designed to protect the juvenile suspect at interrogation.'
121. Id. at 467.
122. 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967).
123. Id.at 492.
124. In re Nelson, 58 Misc. 2d 748, 750, 296 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (1969).
125. 384 U.S. 436, 465-66 (1966).
126. 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
127. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958), commented:
We should not lower the barriers and deny the accused any procedural safeguards against coercive police practices. The trial of
the issue of coercion is seldom helpful. Law officers usually
testify one way, the accused another. The citizen who has been the
victim of these secret inquisitions has little chance to prove coercion. ...
Id. at 443-44.
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Gault required that:
[T]he greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was
not coerced or suggested, but also that it is not the product of ignorance
of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright
12
or despair. 8
If the standard of Gault is to be attained, courts must extend special safeguards to the juvenile at interrogation. One possibility
based on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
would be to grant juveniles a right to have a parent present at
interrogation. 129 To be fully effective, such a safeguard would require that the youth be advised of his right to see his parents for
aid. 30 The protection is needed most for the frightened youth
who desires parental advice but never requests it, not knowing
such help may be available.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends
to the juvenile the vital rights of the Constitution to meet the
standard of fundamental fairness. These rights were extended to
juveniles to further the rehabiliative goals of the juvenile court
system. Along with these constitutional rights, it is necessary to
establish special safeguards for the youthful offender to compensate for his lack of maturity. Such safeguards were established
for the adjudicative stage of juvenile proceedings in Gault, where
the Supreme Court held that both the parent and the minor must
be told of the child's right to counsel.
A crucial stage for the juvenile is the interrogation stage.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been
128. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
129. For a comprehensive discussion of statutory safeguards for the
juvenile as to police practices and interrogation in various jurisdictions
see Ferster and Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REv. 567, 592, 596-98 (1969).
These safeguards for juveniles include requirements that juveniles be
turned over to probation officers before questioning, and prohibiting the
use of juvenile admissions made during interrogation if parents or counsel
are not present. Two reasons are given for the use of these safeguards:
First, juveniles who commit unlawful acts are not criminals and should
not be treated as criminals. Second, juveniles are not mature enough to
understand their rights and are not competent to exercise them. The authors also conclude that it is unlikely these special statutory safeguards
will impede police investigation any more than the Miranda requirements
have done. Id. at 596-98.
130. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966); People v. Dorado,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).

characterized as "one of our nation's most cherished principles."' 81
Safeguards were established in Miranda to protect the adult defendant's ability to exercise his fifth amendment privilege in the
inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation. These
protective devices, however, are of doubtful utility to a juvenile
faced with police interrogation. As in the adjudicative stage,
special safeguards are constitutionally required to offset the disadvantage of immaturity. Several courts have established safeguards by extending the rationale of Miranda and Gault to the
problem of interrogation of juvenile suspects. 132 Although no
protective device could be completely effective, a possible aid for
the juvenile would be the right to a parent's presence. Courts have
consistently refused to hold that juveniles are incapable of competently waiving constitutional rights as a matter of law." 33 Not
every juvenile needs the aid of an advisor to exercise his rights
competently and free from intimidation. The existence of a right
to parental aid will insure that a parent is accessible to juveniles
who would desire it. The existence of such a right for the juvenile would be a departure from the view that refusal of a juvenile's request for parental assistance does not invalidate an otherwise voluntarily given confession. 13 4 This departure, however,
would be compatible with the departure from prior case law taken
by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda in which safeguards were established that must be followed for a confession
to be voluntary.
The safeguard of a right to a parent's presence during juvenile interrogation is consonant with both the free exercise of the
fifth amendment privilege, and the goals of the juvenile court system. As to the former, the right could in part dispel the coercion of incommunicado interrogation. It recognizes the fact that
a juvenile naturally seeks the aid of a parent, rather than of an attorney. It would negate the possibility of intimidation resulting
from denial of such outside assistance. The juvenile court goal
of rehabilitation will be promoted if the juvenile's first impression of the criminal justice system is one of fairness.
CHARLES H. SAYLOR
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132.
(1971);
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966).
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